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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which 
modified federal wiretap law to exempt wiretaps that used a “mobile interception device” from 
  
   
territorial jurisdiction limitations.1  Most mobile phone users have no need to ask themselves who 
could be listening in to their conversations, tracking their Internet use, and monitoring their texts.  
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit set a precedent that granted this access to any law enforcement officer 
in the country able to get a warrant from the magistrate judge.2  Until recently, this broad standard 
was unchallenged, leaving wiretaps for mobile phones explicitly open to any combination of judge 
and enforcer willing to reach out and listen in.  But since 2013, judges and litigants have questioned 
the statutory construction, suggesting that Congress should resolve this jurisdictional paradox.3 
In response, Congress must add a definition for the phrase “mobile interception device” to 
clarify its scope and purpose.  Society is quickly becoming more mobile, and a jurisdictional 
exception exclusively for mobile phones is redundant and invasive in the waves of governmental 
mass surveillance scandals.  This Comment will argue that the historical interpretation of the term 
“mobile” in the “mobile interception device” exception is seriously flawed and allows courts to 
violate key jurisdictional protections for a growing segment of the population.  Specifically, this 
Comment will argue for a narrow, plain meaning interpretation of the phrase, which includes only 
interception devices capable of continuous operation while in motion.  This Comment will also 
address the legislative and judicial loopholes that have masked the flawed exception, and argue 
that even if these loopholes are properly addressed, Congress must clarify the exception to 
 
1  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 106(a), 100 Stat. 
1848, 1856 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012)). 
2  See United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997). 
3  See, e.g., United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1118 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero, J., 
concurring), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017). 
  
   
foreclose potential abuse by law enforcement and keep safeguards in place over realms of 
historically private communications.4 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Wiretapping from Telegraphs to Mobile Phones 
 Wiretap law began with the telegraph in the mid-1800s, when eavesdroppers began 
“tapping” into telegraph wires to listen to messages, and several states began to criminalize 
wiretapping and disclosing messages in general.5  Despite these laws, intercepted telegrams were 
widely used during the Civil War, and in 1920, the first black chamber was set up by the military 
to intercept communications through Western Union.6  In 1928, the United States Supreme Court 
held that warrantless telephone wiretapping—and wiretapping by law enforcement in general—
was constitutional.7  Wiretap warrants were not required until 1967, when the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment guarantees the protection of privacy in telephone conversations for even public 
telephone users.8 
 
4  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
5  See Christopher Woolf, The History of Electronic Surveillance, from Abraham Lincoln’s 
Wiretaps to Operation Shamrock, PUBLIC RADIO INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 7, 2013), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-11-07/history-electronic-surveillance-abraham-lincolns-
wiretaps-operation-shamrock. 
6  See id. 
7  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
8  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
  
   
 The new warrant requirement created the potential for jurisdictional ambiguity. Calls that 
passed through multiple territorial jurisdictions were not new when wiretaps were declared 
constitutional in 1928: the first transcontinental phone call was placed between New York City 
and San Francisco in 1915.9  In 1951, long distance direct-dialing was introduced in a handful of 
states with an inaugural call between Englewood, New Jersey and Alameda, California.10  By 
1967, when the Supreme Court established the warrant requirement, courts were well aware that 
calls could frequently cross state lines.11  Courts had no need to question territorial jurisdiction in 
the age of landline phones because law enforcement could simply obtain a warrant from a court 
with jurisdiction over the telephone line they wish to monitor.12 
 The question of jurisdiction arose when telephones suddenly became mobile.  In 1946, 
phone companies experimented with mobile phone service in which the wire was replaced by a 
radio signal between the phone and a single transmission tower in a single city.13  In 1983, the first 
handheld mobile phone was unveiled, along with the first mobile service in the United States 
 
9  See Phone to Pacific from the Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1915, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0125.html. 
10  See Tom Wilk, Ringing In the New, N.J. MONTHLY, Oct. 10, 2011, 
https://njmonthly.com/articles/jersey-living/ringing-in-the-new/. 
11  See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (noting that calls were placed from Los Angeles to 
Miami and Boston). 
12  See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2012) (procedure for wiretap order applications). 
13  See Gordon A. Gow & Richard K. Smith, MOBILE AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: 
AN INTRODUCTION 23 (Open University Press 2006). 
  
   
capable of calls outside the subscriber’s home city.14  Phones could move between “cells” managed 
by individual radio relays that acted as small telephone exchanges.15  While businessmen and 
technology fans celebrated the start of the wireless age, legislatures contemplated how to legally 
wiretap a phone that transmits calls over unpredictable paths and could be moved outside a wiretap 
warrant’s jurisdiction with little more than a drive across a state line.16 
 
14  See Flashback: What We Said About Mobile Phones in 1983, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 
2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/flashback-what-we-said-about-mobile-phones-in-1983/; 
First Cell Phone a True ‘Brick’, NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 11, 2005), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7432915/ns/technology_and_science-wireless/t/first-cell-phone-
true-brick/. 
15  See id.  It is also important to note that although the cellular network generates valuable 
metadata such as subscriber locations and call records, the wiretaps discussed in the scope of this 
Comment are limited to communications, not metadata.  Metadata collection invokes separate—
albeit similarly disturbing—privacy concerns. See generally Matt Blaze, How Law Enforcement 
Tracks Cellular Phones, EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.crypto.com/blog/celltapping/ (discussing various metadata collection methods that 
are not considered wiretaps). 
16  See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 
27–40 (1985) (statement of Philip J. Quigley, President, PacTel Mobile Cos., and Robert W. 
Maher, Executive Director, Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association) (discussing 
privacy concerns regarding then-unencrypted cellular calls placed in multiple states). 
  




   
B. Legislative History of the Wiretap Act and ECPA 
 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Act), passed partially 
in response to the Supreme Court’s 1967 warrant mandate, included a federal framework for law 
enforcement to request wiretap orders from district courts, often referred to as the Wiretap Act.17  
Law enforcement was required to justify an application for a wiretap order by stating the crime 
committed or to be committed; the location and duration of interception; the type of 
communications law enforcement wishes to intercept; the suspect’s identity, if known; and why 
other investigative procedures have failed or are likely to fail.18  The Act also afforded defendants 
the right to move to suppress evidence derived from a wiretap that was unlawful, granted by a 
facially insufficient order, or performed in violation of the order.19  If the government knew, or 
had reason to know, that the wiretap was unlawful or the order was insufficient, the evidence must 
be suppressed.20  Originally, the judge could authorize an order for interception only within the 
judge’s jurisdiction.21  This presented little cause for concern in the landline era, because the 
jurisdiction where the phone was located could not be changed. 
 The challenges of the new cellular system were addressed by a 1986 amendment that 
relaxed the jurisdictional requirement when law enforcement uses a “mobile interception device” 
 
17  18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012). 
18  Id. § 2518(1). 
19  Id. § 2518(10)(a). 
20  Id. § 2515. 
21  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 
Stat. 197, 219 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012)). 
  
   
to wiretap the target phone.22  The Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) introduced a 
comprehensive set of new provisions and amendments in response to the explosion of personal 
computers and electronic communication devices.23  Congress included the “mobile interception 
device” exception in response to judicial ambiguity over wireless conversations.  The exception is 
the only language that authorizes a wiretap order outside a judge’s territorial jurisdiction within 
the Wiretap Act as amended by the ECPA.  Since 1986, when the ECPA was enacted, Congress 
has passed no new legislation expanding, limiting, or clarifying mobile phone wiretap order 
jurisdiction.  Courts have grappled over what the ECPA amendments actually mean in practice 
within the already contentious framework for wiretap orders, and whether Congress actually 
intended it to actually apply to all mobile phone wiretaps.24  The ECPA also broadened the scope 
of wiretaps to include “wire, oral, [and] electronic communications.”25  Electronic 
communications in turn include almost all data transferred to and from mobile phones, including 
 
22  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (“[T]he judge may enter an ex parte order . . . authorizing or 
approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications . . . outside [the court’s] 
jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device . . . .”). 
23  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986). 
24  Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 
138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997). 
25  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012). 
  
   
Internet content and text messages.26  As a result, most voice messages, texts, and data sent to and 
from mobile phones can be wiretapped by law enforcement under the ECPA. 
C. Circuit Approaches to the Mobile Interception Device Exception 
 The mobile interception device exception creates three separate issues: when it applies, 
how it is relevant to the statutory framework, and whether abuse by law enforcement requires 
suppression of evidence gained by a wiretap.  All of these issues have been fiercely debated by the 
circuits.  The Seventh and Tenth Circuits directly interpreted the phrase “mobile interception 
device” in the context of mobile phone warrants.27  The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. 
Ramirez, adopted a broad, implicit definition that includes any device that intercepts mobile phone 
communications.28 The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Dahda, disagreed and adopted a narrow, 
literal definition that only includes interception devices that are mobile themselves.29 
The Second Circuit, among several others, has also interpreted the term “interception” to 
allow an interception to occur both at the location of the phone and the location where the 
wiretapped conversations are first heard by law enforcement at a listening post, which would 
question the efficacy of jurisdictional limitations.30  Judge DeMoss of the Fifth Circuit argued for 
the narrow, literal definition of “mobile interception device,” and that jurisdictional violations 
from misuse of the exception mandate suppression, as jurisdiction is a core concern of the Wiretap 
 
26  See id. § 2510(12). 
27  See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114; Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
28  See 112 F.3d at 853. 
29  See 853 F.3d at 1114. 
30  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992). 
  
   
Act.31  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the phrase in the context of a listening device 
installed in a vehicle, and held that misuse of the exception by misclassifying the interception 
device requires suppression of evidence, in agreement with Judge DeMoss.32  Consequently, the 
Tenth Circuit adopted Judge DeMoss’s definition but refused to mandate suppression as argued 
by Judge DeMoss and the D.C. Circuit.33 
Until 2017, when the Tenth Circuit challenged the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation 
in Ramirez, legal scholars paid little attention to the mobile interception device exception. The 
only references to the exception outside judicial and legislative work have been through incidental 
analysis of wiretap jurisdiction as a whole, with scant focus on the exception itself.34  The pending 




31  See United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2013) (DeMoss, J., 
concurring). 
32  See United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 513–15 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
33  See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114–16. 
34  See, e.g., Appendix A: State Wiretap Laws (as of June 1, 2002), 52 HASTINGS L.J. 987 
(2003). 
  
   
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Broad Interpretation 
 In United States v. Ramirez, the Seventh Circuit held that the “mobile interception device” 
exception applies broadly to all communications sent to and from mobile devices.35  The 
government was investigating a suspected methamphetamine distributor who lived in Wisconsin 
and traveled to Minnesota to conduct his business using a mobile phone.36  A district judge in the 
Western District of Wisconsin issued a wiretap order for the suspect’s mobile phone.37  To avoid 
being recognized in Wisconsin, the government set up a listening post in Minnesota that 
intercepted calls as they were transmitted over microwave transmission towers using a stationary 
wiretap device.38  Agents soon realized that one of the suspect’s associates was using the phone, 
and he did not leave Minnesota, but he still discussed the illegal operation under investigation.39  
The government returned to the Wisconsin court to apply for an extension for the wiretap, but did 
not disclose that the conversations were occurring in, intercepted in, and monitored in Minnesota.40  
The Seventh Circuit noted that the original order provided that the interception could continue if 
the mobile phone was moved outside Wisconsin, under the authority granted by the “mobile 
interception device” exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).41 
 
35  112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997). 
36  Id. at 850–51. 
37  Id. at 851. 
38  Id. at 851, 853. 
39  Id. at 851. 
40  Id. 
41  See Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852–53. 
  
   
 The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit to interpret the ECPA’s “mobile interception 
device” language, and the court concluded that the exception applies to what is intercepted, not the 
device that is intercepting the calls.42  The Seventh Circuit noted that the legislative history refers 
“to both a listening device installed in a vehicle and to a tap placed on a cellular or other telephone 
instrument installed in a vehicle,” and interpreted such devices to be stationary in reference to the 
phone; therefore, a stationary “bug” device must still qualify as a “mobile interception device.”43  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that a wiretap would be placed further along the 
connection than the handset itself, which implies a wiretap placed at a stationary location outside 
the vehicle would also be a “mobile interception device.”44  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
interpreted the word “mobile” to invoke the concept of a mobile phone as a wiretap target, and 
held that a completely stationary interception device can still qualify as a “mobile interception 
device” if it intercepts mobile phone calls.45  Under the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation, the 
Wisconsin court could issue a wiretap order for mobile phone calls placed, intercepted, and first 
heard in any other jurisdiction in the United States, even if the phone and its user were never 
located within Wisconsin.46 
 
42  Id. at 853. 
43  Id. at 852–53; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 30 (2d Sess. 1986). 
44  Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
45  Id. 
46  See id. at 852 (“It is not certain that the phone in issue was transferred outside of the 
Western District of Wisconsin; it may never have been there; but we do not read the order as 
limited to the case in which the phone was at some time in the district.”). 
  
   
2. The Second Circuit’s Interception Loophole 
In United States v. Rodriguez, the Second Circuit held that the term “interception” in the 
Wiretap Act allows a listening post to be the point of interception for jurisdictional purposes in 
addition to the actual location where the lines are tapped.47  The government obtained a wiretap 
order on five landline phones to investigate an organization suspected of distributing crack 
cocaine.48  Four of the phones were located in a café in New Jersey and one was in an apartment 
in New York.49  All five were monitored using a combination of leased telephone lines that 
rerouted calls through recording devices in New York, as authorized by the Southern District of 
New York.50  Because Rodriguez addressed landline phones, the Second Circuit did not interpret 
the phrase “mobile interception device;” however, it laid the foundation for interpreting the term 
“interception.” 
The court noted that for the four New Jersey phones, an interception occurred when the 
local telephone company rerouted the calls from New Jersey to the listening post in New York.51  
Additionally, an interception occurred when the recorded conversations were first heard by the 
government at the listening post in New York, because the definition of “interception” includes 
 
47  968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992). 
48  Id. at 133. 
49  Id. at 134–35. 
50  Id. at 135; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 734 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(discussing the method used for the wiretap, which was identical to the preceding pen register 
method noted by the Second Circuit). 
51  See Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 135–36. 
  
   
the “aural or other acquisition of the contents” of a communication.52  Therefore, the Second 
Circuit held that the out-of-state wiretaps were still jurisdictionally sound, because the devices 
were installed within the authorizing court’s jurisdiction, and the intercepted communications were 
first heard by agents within the same jurisdiction, regardless of the actual locations of the phones.53 
Judge Meskill, in his concurrence, rejected the majority’s reasoning in holding the 
interception authorized, but concurred because at the time of trial, the government did not know 
or have reason to know that the information had been obtained in violation of Title III—the wiretap 
provisions of the Omnibus Act.54  Regarding the lawfulness of the interception, Judge Meskill 
argued that the territorial jurisdiction limitation of section 2518(3) would be effectively repealed 
by the majority’s interpretation of the term “interception.”55  Judge Meskill pointed out that a plain 
meaning interpretation of “the ‘acquisition of the contents’ of a communication” refers to the 
acquisition of the communications as they are diverted; a transformation of those contents into 
sound to be heard by law enforcement is simply a conversion of previously acquired 
communications.56  Because pen registers were unregulated at the inception of the Wiretap Act in 
1968, the phrase “aural acquisition” was originally intended to simply exclude such non-
conversational devices from the scope of the Act; the broad interpretation was arguably an 
 
52  Id. at 136; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012) (definition of an interception under the 
Wiretap Act). 
53  Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136. 
54  Id. at 145 (Meskill, J., concurring). 
55  Id. at 143–44. 
56  Id. at 144. 
  
   
unintended effect.57  Additionally, the ECPA’s rephrasing of “aural or other acquisition” was 
simply to allow for interception of electronic communications, which were generally already in 
text form.58 
While Judge Meskill posited that Congress never intended a broad interpretation of 
interception that bypassed section 2518(3)’s territorial jurisdiction limitation, he stopped short of 
recommending suppression.59 Section 2515 only requires suppression if the government knew, or 
had reason to know, that the wiretap was unlawful or the order was insufficient.60  Judge Meskill 
found no evidence that suggested the government knew, or should have known, that the wiretap 
order was facially insufficient due to the jurisdictional flaw; therefore, suppression was not 
mandatory, and the district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence was proper.61 
3. The Fifth Circuit’s Prophetic Concurrence 
 In United States v. North, the Fifth Circuit avoided the territorial jurisdiction issue in 
Ramirez by finding that the government failed to minimize its monitoring to exclude conversations 
that were not connected to the investigation.62  Although the court withdrew the original opinion 
and issued a revised decision based on the government’s failure to satisfy the minimization 
 
57  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (2d Sess. 1986); Castillo v. State, 810 S.W.2d 180, 184 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). 
58  See id. at 145. 
59  Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 145 (Meskill, J., concurring). 
60  18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012); see id. at 145. 
61  Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 145 (Meskill, J., concurring). 
62  735 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2013). 
  
   
requirement, a concurrence in the revised opinion captured the original conclusion.63  Judge 
DeMoss first noted that the order in question, issued by the Southern District of Mississippi, was 
used to intercept calls at a stationary listening post in Louisiana as they were made in Texas.64  
Notably, this included a call to another Texas phone during which the appellant disclosed 
incriminating information about an hour into the call.65  Absent the mobile interception device 
exception, such an interception would be outside the Mississippi court’s authority.66  In his 
concurrence, Judge DeMoss pointed out that a statute’s plain meaning controls unless it is at odds 
with the clear legislative intent.67  Judge DeMoss interpreted “mobile” to modify “device” in the 
phrase “mobile interception device” and argued that the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation in 
 
63  Compare North, 735 F.3d at 219 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (finding territorial jurisdiction 
a core concern of Title III of the Omnibus Act), with United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. North, 728 F.3d 429, 437 (5th Cir. 2013), withdrawn, 
North, 735 F.3d at 213) (noting that the Fifth Circuit held that territorial jurisdiction is a core 
concern of Title III). 
64  North, 735 F.3d at 217 (DeMoss, J., concurring). 
65  Id.; see also id. at 214 (majority opinion). 
66  Id. at 217 (DeMoss, J., concurring). 
67  Id. at 217–18 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); 
New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 393 
(5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 
  
   
Ramirez, which focuses on the mobility of the mobile phone, is not obvious when reading the 
statute.68 
 Judge DeMoss also argued that suppression of the Texas call would have been justified 
under section 2518(10)(a), as the territorial jurisdiction violation was a core concern of Title III.69  
Suppression is not a guaranteed remedy—it is only required when a statutory element that “directly 
and substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures” 
is violated.70  Judge DeMoss noted that there was scant legislative history on whether jurisdiction 
was a core concern; however, the territorial jurisdiction requirement safeguards against the risk of 
forum manipulation by law enforcement.71 
 Similarly, in United States v. Denman, the Fifth Circuit previously held that an interception 
occurs at the point where the communication is captured or redirected, as well as the point where 
the contents are first heard.72  While Ramirez and North had listening posts outside the courts’ 
jurisdiction, the wiretap in Denman was authorized by and listened to in the Eastern District of 
Texas, despite intercepting a landline in the Southern District of Texas.73  The Fifth Circuit agreed 
with the Second Circuit in Rodriguez and reasoned that a listening post where the contents of a 
 
68  Id. at 218. 
69  Id. at 219. 
70  North, 735 F.3d at 218 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Donovan, 429 
U.S. 413, 433–34 (1977)). 
71  Id. at 219. 
72  See 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996). 
73  Id. at 401. 
  
   
communication are first heard must qualify as the location of an “aural acquisition” of the 
intercepted communication and, therefore, is included as the location of an interception.74 
4. The D.C. Circuit’s Facial Insufficiency Mandate 
 In United States v. Glover, a case from 2013, the D.C. Circuit held that in the case of a 
facially insufficient order, the core concern test discussed by Judge DeMoss in North is irrelevant 
because the test posed for suppression by section 2518(10)(a)(ii) is mechanical; an order either is 
or is not facially insufficient, regardless of the core concern test.75  The government obtained a 
wiretap order from the D.C. District Court for a recording device in the defendant’s vehicle, which 
was located in Maryland, outside the district court’s jurisdiction.76  The D.C. Circuit first addressed 
whether the last two tests of section 2518(10)(a)—the sufficiency of the order, and an interception 
made outside the order’s authorization—conflated with the first test, which simply grants 
suppression in cases of unlawfully intercepted communications.77  To avoid making the last two 
tests redundant, which would violate a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that the Supreme Court has applied the core concern analysis to the first test alone as a catch-
all over the government’s intercept procedures.78  Other circuits, such as the Third, Fifth, and Sixth 
 
74  Id. at 403. 
75  736 F.3d 509, 513–14 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
76  Id. at 510. 
77  Id. at 513; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2012). 
78  Glover, 736 F.3d at 513. 
  
   
Circuits, have drawn the core concern test into whether an order is insufficient on its face.79  The 
D.C. Circuit held that in the case of a facially insufficient order, suppression is not only afforded 
by section 2518(10)(a), but required by section 2515, because the core concern test would ignore 
the plain meaning of the statute and render it redundant.80 
 The D.C. Circuit also addressed whether a mobile interception device must be initially 
installed within the warrant-issuing judge’s jurisdiction.81  Although this case addressed an actual 
microphone installed to record conversations in a vehicle instead of a telephonic wiretap, such 
devices are still considered mobile interception devices and are classified as wiretaps, as noted in 
an example in the legislative history.82  When first read, it appears that section 2518(3) 
paradoxically allows judges to “authoriz[e] . . . interception . . . within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court in which the judge is sitting,” and to authorize interception anywhere in the United 
States for a mobile interception device, but the mobile interception device must be “authorized by 
a Federal court within such jurisdiction.”83  The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the phrase “such 
jurisdiction” must either refer to the judge’s jurisdiction or implicitly refer to the property on which 
 
79  Id. (citing United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Vigi, 515 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 
1974)). 
80  Id. at 513–14. 
81  See id. at 514. 
82  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 30 (2d Sess. 1986). 
83  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012). 
  
   
the device is installed.84  The D.C. Circuit pointed out that either way, for a judge to issue a valid 
order, the device must be authorized.85  For the device to be authorized, it must be initially installed 
on property located within the judge’s jurisdiction—otherwise, the phrase would be superfluous 
because there would be no other reason to authorize a mobile interception device.86  The D.C. 
Circuit reframed the warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
states that a judge may issue a warrant for property outside their jurisdiction if the property is 
located within it when the order is issued.87  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that the property 
on which a mobile interception device is installed must be inside the authorizing judge’s 
jurisdiction at least when the warrant is issued.88 
 The D.C. Circuit also distinguished Glover from two other circuit cases that excused 
facially insufficient warrants as “technical defects.”89  In United States v. Moore, the Eighth Circuit 
did not mandate suppression when a properly completed wiretap order was mistakenly not signed 
by the magistrate judge.90  Similarly, in United States v. Traitz, the Third Circuit addressed an 
order with a mistakenly omitted page, and used the requesting affidavit and the fact that the judge 
signed the order to presume that the statutory requirements under section 2518 were met, refusing 
 
84  Glover, 736 F.3d at 514. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 515 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)). 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  41 F.3d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1994). 
  
   
to mandate suppression.91  The D.C. Circuit argued that in these cases, the defect was the result of 
a mistake that did not have any practical consequences; however, violation of the territorial 
jurisdiction limitations of section 2518(3) was more than a technical defect and, absent the mistake, 
the order could not have possibly been issued.92  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that an order 
for a mobile interception device must, at a minimum, be issued when the property on which the 
device is installed is located within the judge’s jurisdiction; a judge may not simply issue an order 
for a mobile interception device that would be installed on property consistently outside their 
jurisdiction.93 
5. The Tenth Circuit’s Frustrated Narrow Interpretation 
 In United States v. Dahda, decided on April 4, 2017, the Tenth Circuit became the first 
circuit court to explicitly exclude stationary wiretaps from the definition of “mobile interception 
device.”94  The government obtained wiretap orders from the District of Kansas for mobile phones 
used by the defendant and his co-conspirators.95  The Tenth Circuit addressed whether the orders 
were facially insufficient because they authorized interceptions if the phones were moved outside 
the court’s jurisdiction, regardless of how the interceptions took place.96  The Tenth Circuit agreed 
with all other circuits in holding that an interception occurs both when the communications are 
 
91  871 F.2d 368, 376–77 (3d Cir. 1989). 
92  See Glover, 736 F.3d at 515. 
93  Id. at 516. 
94  853 F.3d 1101, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017). 
95  Id. at 1111. 
96  Id. at 1111–12. 
  
   
redirected in the jurisdiction where the phone is installed, and when the communications are first 
heard at the listening post.97  The Tenth Circuit departed from its sister circuits over the core 
definition of “mobile interception device,” taking issue with the Seventh Circuit’s first holding in 
Ramirez.98 
The Tenth Circuit offered three possible definitions for a mobile interception device: “(1) 
a listening device that is mobile, (2) a cell phone being intercepted, or (3) a device that intercepts 
mobile communications, such as cell-phone calls,” reasoning that only the first definition is in 
accord with the statute.99  Unlike other circuits, the Tenth Circuit began by interpreting the plain 
language of the exception, and reasoned that the term “mobile” is an adjective that modifies 
“device” as opposed to modifying a “phone,” which is not written in the statute.100  The Tenth 
Circuit noted that the Seventh Circuit admitted that the broad interpretation deviates from the plain 
language of the statute.101  The Tenth Circuit rejected this approach, countering the Seventh 
Circuit’s invocation of the car phone bug example in the legislative history by pointing out that 
such a device would be mobile under either interpretation, which demonstrates that the legislative 
history is still in accord with a narrow, literal interpretation.102  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit 
held that while the listening post was located in the authorizing judge’s jurisdiction, the fact that 
 
97  Id. at 1112. 
98  Id. at 1113–14. 
99  Id. at 1113. 
100  Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1113. 
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the order authorized stationary interception of mobile phones outside the jurisdiction at all, in 
violation of the narrow interpretation, is enough to render it facially insufficient, in violation of 
section 2518(10)(a)(ii).103 
While the Tenth Circuit held that the order was facially insufficient, the court refused to 
suppress the evidence obtained from it under section 2515 because it already extended the core 
concern test to section 2518(10)(a)(ii).104  The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the congressional 
examples listed in the Wiretap Act do not show any examples of jurisdictional violations, which 
suggests that suppression is not warranted.105  The Tenth Circuit also suggested that strict 
adherence to jurisdictional rules would cause confusion by requiring prosecutors to coordinate 
wiretap efforts among different jurisdictions on the same case.106  Finally, the Tenth Circuit 
 
103  Id.; see also United States v. Dahda, No. 12-20083-01-KHV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53529 at *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2014) (noting that the listening post was located in the authorizing 
court’s jurisdiction). 
104  Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974) 
(introducing the core concern test for 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i)); United States v. Radcliff, 331 
F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003) (extending the core concern test to 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(10)(a)(ii))). 
105  Id. at 1115 (citing United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974) (declining to 
require suppression when an application for a wiretap misidentified the Assistant Attorney 
General who approved it, because such clerical errors were not mentioned as examples in the 
legislative history)). 
106  Id. (citing Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
  
   
disagreed with Judge DeMoss in his North concurrence, reasoning that the jurisdictional restraints 
do not actually curb the risk of forum shopping because governments could either use an actual 
mobile interception device or establish a listening post in the preferred jurisdiction, which would 
still comply with the statute but could be performed anywhere.107  On October 16, 2017, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Title III mandates suppression for a facially 
insufficient warrant under Dahda.108  The petition and initial briefs submitted to the Court did not, 
however, call into question the interpretation of the mobile interception device exception.109 
In his concurrence, Judge Lucero specifically noted that the exception needs congressional 
attention.110  While Judge Lucero did not object to the majority’s refusal to suppress the evidence 
obtained under the facially insufficient warrant, he suggested that the exception was authored 
under the assumption that a mobile device would be required to intercept mobile phone calls, which 
is no longer the case.111  Although this may have been the goal of Congress, Judge Lucero 
emphasized that the courts cannot torture the language to satisfy the exception in the absence of 
 
107  Id. at 1115–16. 
108  Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, 
Dahda, 138 S. Ct. 356 (Jul. 3, 2017) (No. 17-43), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2372, at *6 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
109  Petition, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.108, at *6; see also Brief for the 
United States in Opposition at I, Dahda, 138 S. Ct. 356 (Sep. 6, 2017) (No. 17-43), 2017 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3249, at *3–4 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition]. 
110  Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1118 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
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even an implied congressional mandate, which is not present in either the language of the statute 
or the legislative history.112  Instead, Congress must modernize the Wiretap Act to meet the 
demands of an increasingly mobile society.113 
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III. ANALYSIS  
A. Breaking into Modern Telecommunications Networks 
 To understand the importance of limiting wiretaps, it is important to understand the 
technological capabilities of law enforcement today.  The circuit cases discussed in this Comment 
are almost all based on phone conversations, yet phone calls are becoming less common than text 
messages.114  Unfortunately, Americans’ shift away from talking does not hinder the Wiretap 
Act—texting and data usage, for Internet access or instant messaging, is still electronic 
communication subject to the same rules as wire communication.115  To that end, privacy-
conscious citizens have long feared governmental intrusion into the privacy of their phones and 
computers. 
 Sadly, that intrusion is real, and law enforcement does not want us to know about it.  For 
example, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) mass surveillance programs were kept secret until 
details were leaked to the press.116  Security experts suggested that such programs can target 
 
114  Corilyn Shropshire, Americans Prefer Texting to Talking, Report Says, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-americans-texting-00327-
biz-20150326-story.html. 
115  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (definition of electronic communication); 18 U.S.C. § 
2518 (2012) (subjecting electronic communication to the same wiretap authorization procedure 
as wire communication). 
116  See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
  
   
essentially any email, chat, voice, file, or social networking communication in the United States.117  
The NSA has also tapped into international data networks to obtain warrantless access to much of 
this web content, as it was hosted and accessible outside the United States.118  Beyond the NSA, 
the FBI has strong-armed large Internet companies into turning over customer data without 
warrants by using hundreds of thousands of national security letters, which are rarely contested.119  
Of course, these programs are not only relatively old news, but are apparently focused on mass 
surveillance of suspected terrorists, who are generally non-citizens.120  The announcement of these 
programs sparked widespread media attention and spawned waves of articles written by legal 
 
117  See NSA Surveillance, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/nsa-surveillance (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2017); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to 
User Data of Apple, Google, and Others, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 7, 2013), 
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118  Sean Gallagher, How the NSA’s MUSCULAR Tapped Google’s and Yahoo’s Private 
Networks, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/information-
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119  Rebecca Grant, Google Tried to Resist FBI Requests for Data, but the FBI Took it 
Anyway, VENTUREBEAT (Jun. 6, 2013), https://venturebeat.com/2013/06/06/google-tried-to-
resist-fbi-requests-for-data-but-the-fbi-took-it-anyway/. 
120  Charlie Savage, Edward Wyatt & Peter Baker, U.S. Confirms that it Gathers Online 
Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-
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scholars.  Mass surveillance is outside the scope of this Comment, but the announcement of its 
prevalence has informed the public how deep law enforcement has dug into the 
telecommunications industry. 
 While local police departments would not have had access to top secret NSA surveillance 
data, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) provides enough of a 
framework to grant law enforcement technical access to all telephone and Internet traffic in the 
United States, similar in scope to the NSA’s programs.121  Since 1995, CALEA requires 
telecommunications companies to implement technology that intercepts wire and electronic 
communications in real time without detection and delivers communications to a listening post 
anywhere in the United States.122  CALEA also facilitates smooth transitions for data collection 
between mobile service providers, such as mobile phones roaming on a different company’s 
network.123 
 Although CALEA-based wiretaps would qualify as a mobile interception device only under 
the broad interpretation of the exception, many law enforcement agencies have actual mobile 
devices that can intercept communications between mobile phones and cell towers.  Cell site 
simulators, often called “Stingrays” as a genericized trademark of the Harris Corporation’s 
StingRay, simulate mobile phone carriers’ cell towers to force nearby mobile phones to connect to 
the simulator, which can be used to track users’ locations, intercept communications, and deny 
 
121  Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012). 
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123  See id. § 1002(d). 
  
   
service.124  Simulators can be optionally configured to only track identification and location data, 
which allows them to be classified as pen registers outside the Wiretap Act, exempting them from 
warrant requirements.125 
 Unfortunately, the companies that manufacture these devices use trade secret law to force 
law enforcement agencies to not disclose their technical specifications.126  Consequentially, 
 
124  See Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-
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125  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CELL SITE SIMULATORS/DIGITAL ANALYZERS/TRIGGERFISH, in 
FOIA Document Production, 10–11 (Oct. 27, 2015) (“Digital analyzers/cell site 
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judges, legislators, and legal scholars are unaware of what these devices are truly capable of.127  
Trademark and patent records show that devices manufactured by Harris Corporation have been 
capable of intercepting, at least, mobile phone voice calls and texts since the mid-1900s.128  
Critically, the fact that these devices are owned and operated by law enforcement agencies invites 
warrantless abuse, as opposed to CALEA-based requests from telecommunications companies. 
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surpassed landlines.129  In short, it appears that law enforcement is actively hiding its ability to 
intercept communications from the most popular method of communication in the United States 
without the telecommunications service provider’s knowledge, and, in theory, without judicial 
oversight. 
Regardless of their ambiguity, cell site simulators are limited to being used in the field, 
while CALEA-compliant telecommunications equipment can intercept all voice, text, and data 
communications sent through any public networks in the United States and send them to a remote 
listening post.  Circuit courts are faced with the 1986 mobile interception device exception, which 
is stuck in the framework of the 1968 Wiretap Act and was only interpreted by a 1997 Seventh 
Circuit case until recently.  This combination of outdated, hardly-scrutinized law leaves district 
and other circuit courts with very little guidance on how to control law enforcement’s 
unprecedented access to Americans’ private conversations and data. 
B. Interpreting the Mobile Interception Device Exception 
1. The Plain Meaning Suggests a Narrow Interpretation 
 The phrase “mobile interception device” plainly refers to an interception device that is 
mobile.  The first step to statutory interpretation is deciphering the statute’s plain meaning.130  The 
 
129  Milestone for Cellphones vs. Landline Phones, CBSNEWS.COM (May 4, 2017), 
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Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the exception’s language is refreshingly sound and reflects the 
obvious plain meaning of the text.  Section 2510 implicitly defines an interception device, but does 
not define “mobile.”131  To do so, we refer to the common definition, which defines “mobile” as 
both a noun and an adjective.132  The noun form—“a portable wireless telephone . . . a mobile 
phone, a cell phone”—lists exclusively British English usage examples.133  The phrase “mobile 
phone” is a predominantly British term as well.  Americans prefer the phrase “cell phone,” 
however, this Comment avoids this phrase because it implicitly sidesteps inquiry into the term 
“mobile” entirely.134 
It is difficult to imagine Congress using such a quaint, unconventional definition when they 
could have simply used the phrase “mobile phone” or even “cell phone”.  The adjective form of 
“mobile” is much more clear—“not fixed or stationary; capable of or characterized by movement;” 
alternatively, a device that “uses wireless portable transmitters and receivers, rather than physical 
connections, to transmit and receive signals.”135  As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the term 
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“mobile” must modify either “interception,” “device,” or both.136  But regardless of which word it 
modifies, the result is the same.  The interception device itself must be mobile.  Modifying 
“interception” would result in a device that can perform mobile interceptions, so at least some part 
of the device must be mobile.  The Wiretap Act states that a “device . . . used to intercept a . . . 
communication” explicitly excludes “any telephone . . . equipment or facility, or any component 
thereof,” further removing mobile phones from the definition of an interception device.137  
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation conjures the term “phone” to twist the 
statute’s plain meaning.  The obvious plain meaning, from an American linguistic perspective, is 
that a mobile interception device is an interception device that is mobile.  
2. The Legislative History Does Not Conflict with a Narrow Interpretation 
 In United States v. Ramirez, the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the only examples in the 
legislative history that invoked the mobile interception device exception.138  Congress pointed “to 
both a listening device installed in a vehicle and to a tap placed on a cellular or other telephone 
instrument installed in a vehicle” as examples of uses of the exception.139  The Seventh Circuit 
argued that these examples suggested that the exception “was intended to carry a broader meaning 
than the literal one,” rendering the examples “illustrative rather than definitional.”140  The Seventh 
 
136  United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 
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139  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 30 (2d Sess. 1986). 
140  Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 852. 
  
   
Circuit twisted the concept of mobile to suggest that a listening device on a car phone is not mobile 
because it is “a stationary device affixed to a stationary object in a moving vehicle.”141 
 The Seventh Circuit’s analytical process here is strained, at best, because a listening device 
in a moving vehicle is, by common sense, a mobile device.  The definition of “mobile” 
encompasses objects that are “capable of or characterized by movement;” more specifically, a 
“facility or service [that is] accommodated in a vehicle so as to be transportable and able to operate 
in different places.”142  To suggest that a device is no longer “capable of or characterized by 
movement” because it is stationary relative to a moving object is disingenuous and reduces the 
distinction to absurdity.  For example, a wristwatch could not be mobile because it is stationary 
relative to the user’s wrist.  As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the examples posited in the legislative 
history describe precisely what Congress intended—an interception device that could physically 
move between jurisdictions to continue intercepting communications as needed.143  The narrow 
interpretation is in accord with the legislative history, so the only reason to bypass the plain 
meaning of the statute would be if it produces an absurd result.144 
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3. The Narrow Interpretation’s Result is Far from Absurd 
 While a plain meaning can be overridden if it produces an absurd result, the result of the 
narrow interpretation is neither absurd nor even unfair.145  The timing of the ECPA suggests that 
Congress was concerned about wiretapping mobile phones, and the lack of any other language 
relevant to mobile phones suggests that Congress was intending the mobile interception device 
exception to cover mobile phones.  The two different interpretations of the exception, however, 
both produce incongruent results with the goals of the Wiretap Act. 
 Under the broad interpretation, jurisdictional limitations are shed when using a “device for 
intercepting mobile communications.”146  The Seventh Circuit does not define “mobile 
communications,” but under the Wiretap Act, a device is “any device or apparatus which can be 
used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,” so the only stipulation that the broad 
interpretation puts on any wiretap is that the communication it captures must be mobile.147  Of 
course, the broad interpretation would include interceptions of mobile phone signals as either wire 
or electronic communications as they are transmitted to and from the cell tower.  Indeed, Congress 
no doubt intended this, because it would have been impossible to predict the path that a mobile 
phone call would make beyond the radio connection to the cell tower until CALEA’s introduction 
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in 1995 made it possible for law enforcement to be able to pinpoint those calls from anywhere in 
the telecommunications network.148 
 Under the narrow interpretation, jurisdictional limitations are shed when using “a mobile 
device for intercepting communications.”149  While somewhat redundant because devices under 
the Wiretap Act must intercept communications regardless, it comes to the same result in the age 
of the ECPA’s introduction in 1986.  A mobile interception device could not intercept landline 
calls, and communications from a mobile phone could not be intercepted without a mobile 
interception device.150  Once CALEA mandated nationwide wiretap capabilities, mobile phones 
could be intercepted as they passed through stationary networks and rerouted regardless of their 
location, but the Wiretap Act was not updated to reflect this change.  Landline phones, with the 
exception of wireless handsets, still cannot be intercepted by mobile interception devices, because 
the only mobile interception devices created have been to intercept mobile phone signals. 
 It appears that the results of either interpretation are identical, but they differ in their 
implementation.  The broad interpretation authorizes stationary wiretaps without regard to the 
plain meaning of the text.  On the other hand, the narrow interpretation authorizes mobile wiretaps 
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in accord with the plain meaning, hardly an absurd result.  While the broad interpretation is not 
necessarily absurd either, technology has outpaced its spirit and the text of the statute as a whole. 
C. Addressing the Loopholes in the Wiretap Act 
 To eliminate ambiguity and modernize the mobile interception device exception, Congress 
should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2510 to append the following definition: 
(22)  “mobile interception device” means any electronic, mechanical, or other device (as 
defined under part 5 of this section) capable of continuous interception while in motion. 
 
 Although law enforcement typically uses CALEA to perform mobile phone wiretaps, this 
definition presents two key advantages over simply removing the mobile interception device 
exception.  First, in emergency situations, law enforcement may have a need to identify and 
intercept communications without telecommunications company assistance, knowledge, or 
delay.151  This amendment protects their reliable ability to do so without jurisdictional limitations 
through the use of a mobile interception device.152  Second, this definition captures and reinforces 
the plain meaning of the language, but also adds a safeguard that the device must be able to operate 
while in motion.  For example, a small device that hooks into a phone line could theoretically be 
described as “mobile” while not in use.  This definition avoids that loophole by requiring the device 
to be “capable of continuous interception while in motion.”  A cell site simulator installed in a 
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vehicle may not be mobile according to the Seventh Circuit’s “stationary bug” theory, but it can 
continue to operate while in motion. 
 Several circuits have argued that by limiting law enforcement to a single jurisdiction—or, 
with the dual reading of “interception,” two jurisdictions—the legislature would reduce judicial 
and enforcement efficiency, and further chip away at privacy, by requiring wiretap orders from 
judges in each jurisdiction where the mobile phone is used.153  But as the Tenth Circuit pointed 
out when admitting the inefficacy of its new interpretation of the exception, the dual reading of 
“interception” already grants the government the ability to forum shop.154  The root of the problem 
is that by permitting listening post interceptions, Congress and the judiciary grant law enforcement 
the ability to perform wiretaps that are in clear violation of jurisdictional boundaries.155  No circuit 
has firmly held that an interception only occurs at the point where the communications are 
intercepted.  Although it would take only a minor change to the Wiretap Act, it appears unlikely 
that Congress would roll back this popular loophole in wiretap law. 
 The interception loophole, however, does not render repairing the mobile interception 
device exception a wholly moot proposition.  Assume, hypothetically, that a law enforcement 
agency in Texas wishes to wiretap a mobile phone in South Carolina, but judges in Texas and 
South Carolina are protective of privacy and are not willing to issue the order.  A judge in New 
 
153  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992) (“If all of the 
authorizations are sought from the same court, there is a better chance that unnecessary or 
unnecessarily long interceptions will be avoided.”). 
154  Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1115–16. 
155  See Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 144 (Meskill, J., concurring). 
  
   
York, however, is willing to be flexible, so she issues an order that is used to perform a stationary 
wiretap.  Under the broad interpretation, this is completely acceptable.  Under the narrow 
interpretation, it is not.  The Tenth Circuit argued that to comply, law enforcement may simply set 
up a listening post in New York.156  But to do so, law enforcement must expend at least some 
modicum of effort, either by obtaining the cooperation of New York law enforcement or traveling 
to New York to do it themselves. 
Therein lies the paradox.  Law enforcement relies on the mobile interception device 
exception for stationary wiretaps, but courts are reluctant to tighten the exception because law 
enforcement could still use stationary wiretaps with extra effort.  Congress must step in to resolve 
the issue by amending section 2510 to define the exception and guide judges and law enforcement 
to satisfactorily apply the proper narrow interpretation, which would be unavoidable under the 
amended definition.  The additional burden that the amendment would place on law enforcement 
is, perhaps, even too little of a roadblock in the face of such a blatant privacy nightmare as allowing 
any law enforcement agent in the country to monitor any mobile phone in the country simply on 
the grounds that it is a mobile phone.  To subject law enforcement to the choice of one or two 
jurisdictions is more than enough for the purposes of such serious invasions of privacy.  Ultimately, 
the safeguard that the narrow interpretation imposes is a critical one in light of ongoing mass 
surveillance scandals. 
1. Effects of the United States v. Dahda Suppression Ruling 
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 On October 16, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Title III 
mandates suppression for a facially insufficient warrant under Dahda.157  The government did not 
dispute the narrow interpretation of the exception used by the Tenth Circuit.158  During oral 
argument on February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court appeared to focus on the insufficiency of the 
Dahda wiretap order and did not address the interpretation of the mobile interception device 
exception.159  Accordingly, the Supreme Court review of Dahda will probably not resolve the 
interpretation question. 
 The submitted briefs focus on the right of suppression granted by sections 2518(10) and 
2515, and whether territorial jurisdiction is a core concern of Title III.160  If jurisdiction is a core 
 
157  Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017); see Petition, supra note Error! 
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not defined.109, at *3–4. 
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U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 15, at *14. 
159  See Richard M. Re, Argument analysis: What makes wiretap orders 
“insufficient”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 22, 2018, 12:39 PM), 
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generally Dahda v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/dahda-v-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2018) (timeline of proceedings). 
160  See Brief for the United States at 12–15, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.158, 
at *23–28; Brief for the Petitioners at 14–16, Dahda, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 4666, at *26–29. 
  
   
concern, or the core concern test is irrelevant, the court must suppress evidence obtained through 
warrants that violate jurisdictional requirements.161  This result shifts the question back to the 
interpretation of the mobile interception device exception, because failure to meet the requirements 
of the exception would trigger suppression of evidence.  If, however, jurisdiction is not a core 
concern, Congressional attention is required.  The mobile interception device exception, along 
with the rest of section 2518’s territorial jurisdiction requirements, would be rendered superfluous 
because courts would no longer need to suppress evidence obtained through wiretap orders that do 
not comply with section 2518, despite Congress’s clear intent to impose section 2518’s 
jurisdictional requirements on wiretap orders.162 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Law enforcement is more than well equipped to intercept the communications of 
Americans without the help of the needlessly broad interpretation of the mobile interception device 
exception spearheaded by the Seventh Circuit.163  In 1986, Congress was primarily concerned with 
simply facilitating mobile phone wiretaps.  Federal courts and law enforcement have taken that 
exception to its extremes, imbuing it with a definition it was not intended to have and empowering 
 
161  Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1114–16 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding 
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it with a rapid shift in technology on all sides.  The Tenth Circuit caught this interpretive quirk and 
corrected it, but failed to follow through with mandatory suppression.164  The Supreme Court has 
not been asked to weigh in.165 
 Because federal courts are hesitant to move forward, it is Congress’s turn to fix the paradox.  
The only amendment to make is the addition of a definition of the phrase “mobile interception 
device.”  Congress was unaware of the future of technology in 1986, but it has had over two 
decades to catch up since CALEA opened up the possibility of stationary mobile phone wiretaps.166  
Law enforcement now has the technology to intercept mobile phone communications and locations 
both in the field and from their desks.  Worse, they can do so from their desks for any phone in the 
United States.  In the waves of mass surveillance scandals, this is not the theme that our nation’s 
wiretap law should cling to.  If the government wishes to break into our private mobile lives, it 
should do so under clear, concise, and controlling guidelines.  To give law enforcement any 
additional leeway is only another step on the long road to an Orwellian elimination of privacy. 
 
164  See Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114, 1116. 
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